lPv6 Transition: Why A New Security Mechanisms Model Is Necessary. by Hj Mat Taib, Abidah et al.
lPvG Transition:
why a new security mechanisms model is necessary
Abidah Hj Mat Taib
Faculty of Information Technology and
Quantitative Science
Universiti Teknotgi Mara perlis
Malaysia
abidah@perlis. uitm.edu. my
ABSTRACT
This paper describes the scenario in the transition oflpv4 to lpv6
with focusing on the security issues involved in each of the
transition methods: dual stack and tunneling. Then, the paper
analyze the existing secwity mechanisms available and identifu
new considerations for a new security model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
IPv4 has been existed more than twenty years and supported
various kinds ofapplications and services to ihe organizations and
Internet users. Although it has played u s,lccerrful role in theinternetworking environment, an explosive growth and
tremendous demand for new Ip addresses has made it no longer
capable in serving the current and future demands of the Interiet
users all over the world. As new lntemet protocol, Ipv6. and next
generation network has come along with their promising features,
the deficiencies experienced in lpv4 wil be takln."r" o]by lpu6.
Thus, enterprises and tntemet Service providers (ISp) siall go
ahead with the transition and enjoy what lpv6 can offer.'Althoulh
there is additional cost involves when migrating, stay put and not
making a transition at all and just continue to patch Ipv4 from
time to time also involves high cost for both customers ISps.
However, IPv6 deployment will not replace the lpv4 instantly
since most of network applications and services are in Ipv4. DuLto the scale of IPv4 network and for enterprises to maintain
curent levels of service, the transition will be a long process
where IPv6 will be added to be operated in parallel with lpv4.
This gradual migration is possible through varilus transition tools
yltjgh can be categorized as dual staclg tunneling and hanslation[,2]. The most viable way to deploy lpv6 is through dual stack
and configured tunneling [3]. Nevertheless, translation is still
important when communicating between Ipv6 and legacy lpv4.
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This paper will not cover translation security aspects as it is not in
the scope ofour research. Since each method offfansition has its
own security issues, and process of migration rnay consume a
long period which could take years to complete, securiry
consideration in the coexistence and migration become important
and need proper attention. We have to consider both protocols(IFv4 and IPv6) security issues. Given the current securitv
mechanisms like firewall, IDS and IpS, auditing and lpsec, are
our assets and resources maintain secured in the transition period?
To answer the question, we have to look at each of possible
transition tools and study its specific weaknesses to anticipate the
potential thrcats that larer may change to attacks. With this
awareness, we need to come up with additional considerations and
modifications to the current practice for the better security ofthe
transition period.
In this paper we discuss possible transition mechanisms from lpv4
to IPv6 with focusing on the specific security issues for each
mechanism. To begin, we highlight the transition process or
coexistence/migration scenario and the importance of securing the
transition period. Then, we briefly discuss the most possible
transition mechanisms: dual staclq funneling and translation, as
well as the related specific security issues. This followed with
overview the IP security (IPsec), analyze the current security
mechanisms and the new security model for the transition period.
Finally, we sum up all arguments in the conclusion.
2. COEXISTENCE AND NIIGRATION
2.1 Dual stack
Dual stack technique requires hosts and routers to irnplement both
IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. This enables networks to support both
IPv4 and IPv6 services and applications during the transition
period in which IPv6 services emerge and lpv6 applications
become available. Figure I shows a typical Ip dual stack
architecture. Nodes will use IPv4 to communicate with lpv4
nodes, and use IPv6 to communicate to lpv6 nodes. Even though
IPv4 and IFv6 networks are on the same link, the dual stack router
has to maintain two routing tables and the Ipv4 and Ipv6 nodes
are not able to communicate directly to each other. Meanwhile,
an IPv4/v6 node needs a DNS resolver that capable of resolving
both types of DNS address records. So, the host can make
decisions about when connection should be made using lpv4 or
IPv6. The determination of protocol version is automatic, based
on the available Domain Name System (DNS) records. Because
this is based on the DNS, and normal users would use fullv
qualified domain name in email addresses and URLs, the
hansition from IPv4 to IPv6 is invisible to normal users.
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Figure 1: Typical IP dual stack architecture
2.2 Tunneling
Tunneling is needed when communicating between two end-to-
end IPv6 hosts while the intermediate network is still in IPv4' To
permit sending ofpackets, IFv6 packet is encapsulated in an lPv4
packet at the tunnel entry point (a dual stack router) so that it can
travel through the IPv4 cloud before reaching the other exit point
where it will be decapsulated and forwarded to the intended
recipient. As a result, we have IPv6 packet in an IPv4 packet
a.k.a. IFv6-in-IPva @igure 2).
deprecated. However, some that are still preferred are 6to4 and
ISATAP where IPv6 node can use different types of addresses
such as 6to4 or ISATAP addresses to dynamically tunnel IPv6
packets over an IPv4 routing infrastructure. Another method is
Teredo which involves tunneling packets over UDP to make IPv6
available to IPv4 host through one or more layers of network
address translator (NAT). It is the last option used when no other
method will work.
2.2.1 6to4
6to4 uses automatic IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling to interconnect
IPv6 networks and uses 6to4 routers and relays which accept and
decapsulate IPv4 protocol 4l ('IPv6-in-IPv4') from any node in
the IPv4 internet. Three general threat of 6ta4 arc denial of
service (DoS) attacks where a malicious node prevents
communication between the node under attack and other nodes'
reflecting DoS attacks, and service theft where a malicious
node/site/operator may make unauthorized use of service [5].
These threats arise due to 6to4 must behave as follows:
r All 6to4 routers must accept and decapsulate IPv4 packeB
from every other 6to4 router and from 6to4 relays.
o All 6to4 relay routers must accept traffrcs fiom any native
IPv6 node.
So, 6to4 routers are not able to identi$ whether any 6to4 relays
are legitimate. Besides 6to4 relays can b€ subject to
"administrative abuse" 6to4 architecture can be used to participate
in 'lacket laundering" which making another attack harder to
trace. Thus, makes the logging and auditing firnctions of 6to4
traffrc extremely critical. Hence, it is crucial to have 6to4 router
or relay security checks be correctly implemented
2.2.2 ISATAP
ISATAP (lntra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol)
connects IPv6 hosts/routers over an IPv4 network. It views the
IPv4 network as a link layer for IPv6 and views other nodes on
the network as potential IPv6 hostVrouters and therefore does not
require the underlying IFv4 network infrastructure to support
multicast. It defines a method for generating a link-local IPv6
address from an IPv4 address. ISATAP host is configured with a
potential router list (PRL), which is a set ofentries about potential
routers that used to support router and prefix discovery' Since
PRL provides a list of IPv4 addresses representing advertising
ISATAP interfaces ofrouters that hosts use in filtering decisions,
PRL must be kept up to date [6]. To avoid IP spoofing, the IPv4
virtual link must be delimited carefully at the network edge, so
that extemal IPv4 hosts cannot pretend to be part of the ISATAP
link. In addition, site border routers should implement IPv4
ingress filtering and IP protocol 4l filtering' Protecting ISATAP
traffic can also be done by configuring lPsec for IFv4 policy
settings to protect, all traffic with IP protocol set to 4l'
2.2.3 Teredo
Teredo involves tunneling packes over UDP to make IPv6
available to IPv4 host through one or more layers of network
address ffanslator (NAT). It aims to provide nodes located behind
a NAT with a globally routable IPv6 address. It is the last option
used when no other method will work. The negative effects of
Teredo services can be classifr into four categories: security risks
of directly connecting a node to the IPv6 Intemet, spoofing of
Teredo servers to enable man in the middle attaclg potential
attacks aimed at denying the Teredo service to a Teredo client,
and denial of service anacks against non-Teredo participating
lPv6 lTransPort lDataHeader I LaYer
Header
ii?fil'flT' + f RffiTf"'tr
lPv4
Header
Figure 2. Encapsulating IFv6 in IPv4
Tunneling can be automatic or manually configured. Manually
configured tunneling a.k'a lPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling is point-to-
point hrnnels where lPv4 tunnel's endpoint address is determined
6y configuration information on the encapsulation node' For
control oi the nrnnel paths and to reduce the potential for tunnel
relay denial of service (DoS) attacks, manually configured tunnels
can-be advantageous over automatically configured tunnels' There
are a number of considerations need to take into account when
deciding which type of tunneling to be chosen. We can opt for
configured tunnel ifour ISP provides IPv6 connectivity through a
tunnei to some dual-stacked host or router within our network' As
an altemative, to easily deploy IPv6 is by tunneling through
tunnel broker. This service is a configured tunnel which is
provided by an independent supplier such as Hexago Gateway 6
[+1. fo. a start, an enterprise can subscribe to this tunnel broker
and continue doing so until there is a need to deploy a
comprehensive IPv6. As for automatic tunneling, it has now been
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nodes that would be enable by the Teredo service [7]. As for
countermeasure, Teredo nodes can use lpsec services like IntemetKey Exchange (IKE), Authenticated Header (AH) and
Encapsulating Security payload (ESp). Encrypting the client,s
IPv6 traflic using IPsec will prevent third parties from spooling
and listening of the lpv6 packets, even if the Ipv4 and UDF
headers are wlnerable.
2.3 Translation
Translation is needed when the hosts can only communicate using
IPv6 at the network layer. Translation techniques are varied
according to the layer they may appear: network layer, transport
layer or application layer. In the network layer, the header ofthe
datagram is translated from lpv6 to lpv4 (or vice versa), which
happans in the operating system of the originating host. In the
transport layer, the general mechanism is the use of relav. which
the data has to pass through. This relay is commonly a dual stack
device that will translate and pass on datagrams between the
different networks. In the application layer, an..application layer
gateway" (ALG) is used, e.g. a web proxy. ALGs have to be set
up for each and every application or service one wants to offer.
Among IPv6 translation methods available are Stateless Ip/ICMp
Translation (SIIT), Network Address Translation_protocol
Translation (NAT-PT) and NApT-pT.
3. SECT]RITY ISSUES
The Fansition from native Ipv4 network to a network where lpv4
and IPv6 co-exists creates extra security considerations which
need to be looked into closely. Basically the severity of these
issues related to the complexity of the transition mechanisms
chosen. Security issues will be inhoduced either in the
mechanisms themselves, in the interaction between mechanisms
or by introducing unsecured paths through multiple mechanisms
t8l.
3.1 Dual-stack Issues
Being dual stack, a device must employ adequate host security
mechanisms as its applications can be subjecito attack on both
IPv4 and IPv6. Therefore, any host controls such as firewalls.
VPN clients and IDSs must be able to inspect traffic from both Ip
versions and block specific traffrc when a block is necessarv.
What the network adminishator should consider here is to extend
the firewall with IPv6 support and conesponding rule sets for
IPv6 or implement separate lpv6-only firewall which can secure
the hosts and network as the same way its Ipv4 counterpart does.In addition, appropriate Ipv6 access control lists (ACLs) must
also- crafted and placed accordingly which are capable to
implement the same restrictions as Ipv4's ACLs .
3.2 Tunneling Issues
Some generic dangers to tunneling include [3,g,9,10]:
o no authentication mechanism for tunnels except a check onthe IPv4 packet's source address which is easilv
circumvented by Ip spoofing 
.
r attacker may inject arbitrary lpv6 packets into the lpv6
network at a tunnel endpoint simply by spoofing the lpv4
address ofthe other endpoint.
. it may be easier to bypass firewalls and avoid ingress
filtering checks
r it is possible to attack the tunnel interface: several lpv6
security mechanisms depend on checking that Hop Limit
equals 255 on receipt and that link-local addresses are used.
o automatic tunneling mechanisms are susceptible to packet
forgery and DoS attacks as there is no preconfigured
association befween endpoints.
Certain tunneling mechanisms establish communication with
native IPv6 nodes or between the automatic hrnnelins
mechanisms via the use of relay. These relays provide a potential
vehicle for address spoofing, DoS and other threats.
To look at each tunneling techniques security issues, we
summarize them into a table below.
Table 1. Tunneling mechanisms and their speciffc security
$sueg
At a host behind IPv4 firewall, need to open
firewall for protocol 4l (Ipv6) and in some
cases also for protocol 58 (ICMPv6) at least
for the host at the remote end of the tunnel,
which will be the source of the incoming Ipv4
traffic that contains the IPv4 packets.
Tunnel Broker A site administrator may be blissfully
unaware of users on their site who use tunnel
brokers, thus not creating any site demand for
*propef' IFv6 deployment and possibly
creating security holes which the
administrator does not know about and
therefore does not guard against.
o Attacks with Neighbor Discovery (ND)
Messsages.
r Spoofing traffic to 6to4 nodes
o Reflecting traffrc from 6to4 nodes
o Local IPv4 broadcast attack
Possible spoofi ng attack:-
. boggs IP protocol 4l packets are injected
into an ISATAP link from outside.
o bogus IP protocol 4l packets are injected
from within an ISATAp link by a node
pretending to be a router.
. Bypassing security contols
o Reducing deferue in depth
o Allowing unsolicited traffic
r Laundering Dos attacks from IPv4 to lpv4
o Dos attacks from lpv4 to lpv6, Ipv6 to
IPv4
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4. SECURITY MECIIANISMS
Ample security mechanisms are important to protect electronic
communications from malicious individuals who are determine
to spooi corrupt, alter or destroy the data or render critical
services unavailable. This involves safeguarding every device
that is participating in networked communication and all
information that either is stored on a device or is in transit
between communicating devices. Since lPsec is mandated in
every IPv6 capable device, we should consider it seriously to
p.ouid" the necessary authentication, integrity and
confi dentiality services.
4.1 IP Security (IPsec)
IPsec provides data confidentiality, data integrity and data
origin authenticity between participating peers: a pair of hosts, a
paii of security gateways or between a security gateway and a
irost. IPsec uses the Intemet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol to
handle negotiation of protocols and algorithms based on local
policy, and to generate the encryption and authentication keys to
6e used. Compared to IPv4 which had to retrofit IPsec headers
into the original IPv4 frame, IPv6 supports IPsec within the
defined packet structure using extension headers. IPsec consists
oftwo protocols: authentication header (AH) and encapsulating
security payload (ESP). AH provides data authentication and
optional anti-replay services while ESP provides confidentiality,
data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, anti-replay
service and haffic flow confidentiality for all end-to-end data
transported in an IP packet. Both protocols support two modes
of operation: transport mode and tunnel mode. In transport
mode, two hosts provide protection primarily for upper layer
protocols. The cryptographic endpoints are the source and
destination of the data packet. As for AH in transport mode, the
whole payload including the fields of the IPv6 header, which do
not change in transit, is secured. While in tunnel mode, the inner
packets of AH contains the tP address of sender and receiver.
The outer IP header contains the IP address of the tunnel
endpoints. Thus, the complete original packet including the
fields of the outer header that do not change in transit, is
secured. As for ESP in transport mode, the lP header and the
Extension Headers that follow are not encrypted; otherwise the
packet could not be forwarded. Ifthe complete packet has to be
encrypted, the choice is to use tunnel mode. Figure 3 and figure
4 demonstrate IPv6 lPsec AH and ESP protection in transport
mode and tunnel mode respectively. The ESP can be used with a
NULL encryption option, which makes only the authentication
option of the ESP is used, and the packet is not encrypted.
Original lP
Header
Extension
Headers
Upper layer
protocol (TCP)
DataAH:
Apply lPsec
ESP :
Apply IPsec
EncryPted +
Original lP
Header
Hop-by-hop, Routing
Fragment, Dest.OPt(if nresent)
AH Dest. Opt
(if present)
TCP Data
Original lP
Header
Extension
Headers
Upper layer
protocol (TCP)
Data
Original lP
Header
Hop-by-hop, Routing
Fragment, Dest.OPt
(if present)
ESP Dest. Opt
(if present)
TCP Data ESP
Trailer
ESP auth
(if present)
Figure 3. AMSP in TransPort Mode
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Figure 4. AII/ESP in Tunnel Mode
Although the AH and ESp protocols provide the actual
cryptographic services at the network layer, we still need
mechanisms that will determine which services should be
applied to different traffic flows, and to negotiate the required
cryptographic keys for those services. These tasks are
accomplished tbrough a cornbinations of Security policy
Database (SPD), ttre Security Association (SA) and the Intemet
Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. The SpD identifies the service
to-be applied to IPsec packets, and is consulted in the processing
of,all traffic (inbound and outbound), including non_Ipsei
traffic. For any packet, SpD will identifr process to proceed,
either discard, bypass lpsec, or aplly Ipsec. The SA is use bv
IPsec to keep track ofthe details ofa negotiated Ipsec session'sbetween two nodes. A pair of SAs is required for
communication between a pair of nodes. An SA ii uniquely
identified by a destination Ip address, a securify prjocot
identifier (AII or ESp), and a Security parameter tnOix iSfg. tt
solves a problem of tracking the IKE agreements with respect to
service$, algorithms, and parameters for particular haffic flows.
The IKE determines which service should be applied to thedifferent traffic flows, and to negotiate A. required
cryptographic keys for those services. IKE has nvo phases:
Phase I is used to establish a secure channel (ISAKAMP SA)
lhrough which IPsec cryptographic services and algorithm canbe negotiated. Another phase, phase 2 is the actual negotiation
of the lPsec cryptographic services and algorithms through the
secure channel established in phase l.
4.2 Carrent Security Model
The preferred model for enterprise network security in lpv4
stresses the use of a security perimeter controlled by
autonomous firewalls and incorporating NATs. Both perimetei
fnewalls and NATs infoduce asymmetric and reduce the
transparency of communications through these pdrimeters. At
present, we just make use of similar firewalling and intrusion
detection techniques meant for lpv4 but still inadeguate to check
IPv4 traffic. [1,13] Table 2 highlights some existing security
mechanisms or threats mitigation techniques and their respectivl
challenges to handle IPv6 traffic. While Ipsec may be use to
solve many issues in IPv4 or lpv6, it has some limitations. For
instance, in a scenario where we do not have prior trust
relationship, we need to first establish an Ipv6 address in order
to set up the IP security associations which creates a chicken
and egg problern. Nevertheless, Ipsec can be used in
environment where prior relationship exists and there is a pre_
defined security model in place which relies on either pre_
configured keys or a PKI infrastructure.
As for IDS systems, Network-based IDS (NIDS) and Host-based
IDS (HIDS) can be applied concurrently where NIDS detect
attacks by capturing and analyzing nerwork packets while HIDS
could analyze the data with greater reliability and more
precisely. Since IPv6 has not been widely use worldwide, we
are yet to see the IPv6 signature database for IDS.
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Table 2. IPv6 Mitigation Techniques and Challenges
Mitigation
Techniques
Challenges
Firewalls Lots of different extension headers and options
make it hard for a firewall to filter correctly and
get it right not to buffer overflow ot ?91:_
IPsec IPsec is not always a valid securif option
because of a bootstrapping problem.
(improve series: RFC4301 - RFC4309)
Loggingl
Auditing
Most logging and auditing of lPv6 traffic is
implemented using IPv4 transport, need IPv6
transport to successfully log and audit dual-
stack network infrastructure.
lntrusion
Detection
Lack of signature database. Pattern based
mechanisms used for IPv4 may not be the most
appropriate as end-to-end encrypted becomes
more prevalent. Futue systems may be more
reliant on traffic flow pattern recognition.
of managed host-based frrewalls on top of the conventional
perimeter firewall model with the aim to implement defense in
depth. This involves a combination of centralized security
policy repositories and distribution mechanisms (see Figure 6)'
Thus, permits network managers to place more reliance on
security mechanisms at the end points and allow end points to
influence the behavior of the perimeter firewalls. Perimeter
firewalls responsible for securing the network from general
attacks, and the end node responsible for securing itself from
node-related attacks. So, flnewall policies must consider all
related specific security issues in the IPv6 transition as well as
following an established firewall deployment model on a
network. IPsec may be used to solve many issues in IPv6. For
instance, tunneled lPsec may contain malicious data, which can
be mitigated through lPsec firewall. There could be slightty
different requirement between an enterprise security model and
unmanaged network security model.
4.3 ANew Security Model
Since transition to IPv6 will be a long process, we must be ready
with a better tools to secure our assets and resources while
deploying IPv6 in parallel with IPv4. Moreover, as highlighted
by a prominent hacker, Van Hauser, there are attacking tools
that are already available to be used [12]. For a start these tools
can be used for penetrating test as well as improving security on
our networks (see Figure 5) by expanding the mitigation
techniques in Table 2.
Figure 5. Penetrating test to improve security on the
cor?orate network.
Besides the mitigation techniques, each ent'erprise needs to
devise optimum security policies to ensure the most effective
security architecture while migrating to IPv6. The main goal is
to safeguarding the confidentiality, integdty, accountability and
availability of the devices and the data. The bottom line, any
effective security policy always needs to be technically feasible'
operationally, deployable and enforceable [9].
A new model should incorporate the concept of disfibuted
firewall. As suggested by Hagen [13], new model has to consists
Figure 6. A combination of centralized securtty policy
repositories and distribution mechanisms
5. CONCLUSION
Transition to IPv6 will be a long process in which both IPv4 and
IPv6 will coexist and interoperating for a long while. The
transition mechanisms available include dual stack, tunneling
and translation. Each transition method may introduce some
security effects which need to be countered for both protocols.
Since both protocols co-exists in the networh current security
mechanisms that support only IPv4 traffic or network properties
are not sufftcient. While lPsec must be implemented in
standards compliant implementations, all protocols and
mechanisms of IPsec need to be examined in the aim of making
it useful for securing the migration period as well as the native
IPv6. New considerations that apply to networks and traffrc in
the IP transition need to be identified and analyzed- Among of
those analysis have been highlighted in the paper. A new
security model and revised policy are crucial for securing the
transition period as the network could be under attack or
inadvertently misused by the naive worker. Our future work
Goal: safeguarding
confidentiality, integdty,
accountability and
availability.
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will focus on designing rhe new model and testins it for
efficiency.
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